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The Influence of Customer Scope on Supplier Learning
and Performance in the Japanese Automobile Industry
ABSTRACT
Most studies on Japanese supplier-automaker relationships have focused on the nature of
the dyadic inter-firm relationship and the performance of the assembler. We examine the
relationship between a Japanese supplier’s “customer scope strategy” (i.e. number of
customers) and the supplier’s performance. By analyzing data on 125 suppliers, we found
that a supplier with broad automotive customer scope tends to be more profitable and is
better off with less exclusive ties. This relationship held even after controlling for supplier
size, product type, and the underlying competitiveness/efficiency of each supplier. We
argue that a broad customer scope strategy Ieads to superior pedormance primarily due to
learning opportunities. This finding highlights a key liability of vertical integration since
integration of inputs often limits the ability of in-house divisions to access new customers.
However, there is a limit to the advantages of a broad customer base, since sales to
“unrelated customers” (e.g., non-automotive) did not have a significant impact on
performance. In short, there appear to be diminishing returns to customer scope as
suppliers add “dissimilar” customers with requirements fi.u-ther from their core knowledge
domain. Thus, these findings offer empirical support for the knowledge based view of the
firm which suggests that the efficient boundaries of firms are driven by knowledge
domains/considerations. Our findings also suggest that studies that focus only on the
advantages of long-term cooperative relationships may be misleading if interpreted to mean
that an exclusive supplier-assembler relationship is the optimal solution for the supplier.
(Key Words: Organizational Learning; Knowledge-Based View; Japanese Supplier
Relations).
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Introduction
The formation of partnerships between firms has been described as an increasingly
important way for firms to develop and maintain competitive advantage (Nishiguchi, 1994;
Mohr & Spekman, 1994). Indeed, “Japanese style” alliances have been heralded as a
critical source of competitive advantage for large Japanese assemblers (Clark & Fujimoto,
1991; Gerlach, 1992; Dyer & Ouchi, 1993; Nishiguchi, 1994). In particular, numerous
studies have emphasized the advantages of long-term, cooperative partnerships in Japan,
comparing them with arms-length relationships in Western industry (Abernathy, Clark and
Kantrow, 1983; Cole and Yakushiji, 1984; Cusumano, 1985; Asanuma, 1989; Womack et
al, 1990; Clark and Fuj imoto, 199 1; Nishiguchi, 1994; Helper and Sake, 1994; Dyer,
1996a). The literature has suggested that cooperative supplier-assembler relationships in
Japan outperform their U.S. counterparts by sharing more information, investing in
relation-specific assets, and minimizing transaction costs. These studies have also implied
that cooperative supplier-assembler relationships are supported by the Japanese keiretsu
system wherein suppliers have highly exclusive relationships with particular assemblers
(Lincoln, et. al., 1992; Dyer and Ouchi, 1993). To date, most studies on Japanese supplier-
assembler relationships have focused on the nature of the inter-firm relationship and the
benefits to the assembler of managing suppliers in a particular way (e.g., as partners).
However, despite the extensive list of studies on the nature of dyadic inter-firm
relationships, the flip side of this relationship (i.e. the supplier’s customer strategy and
performance) has rarely been considered or examined.
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This paper examines the relationship between a supplier’s “customer scope strategy”
(i.e. the number of customers it has and proportion of business to each customer) and the
supplier’s performance. In developing a customer scope strategy,, suppliers face the
following dilemma: “Asasuppliera mIbetteroffselling l/40fmy output to four different
customers, or am I better off achieving the same sales volume by concentrating on a single
customer and selling 100 percent of my output to that customer?” Past researchers have
found a positive relationship between cooperative inter-firm relations and both automaker
and supplier performance (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; Helper and Sake, 1994;
Nishiguchi, 1994). Indeed, a supplier with a single customer will presumably find
cooperation easier with
customers) because the
competitors through the
that customer (when compared to a supplier with four competing
customer does not have to worry about knowledge spillovers to
supplier. These types of exclusive supplier-assembler relationships
are believed to be critical for enabling Japanese firms to achieve the cooperation necessary
to realize high levels of performance.
However, as recent studies have suggested (Takeishi and Cusumano, 1995; Dyer,
1996b), the emphasis on cooperative supplier relationships and the notion of the keiretsu
group sometimes leads to a misunderstanding
relationships between assemblers and suppliers in
reality, many suppliers sell their components
manufacturers (Nishiguchi, 1994; Nobeoka, 1995),
that there are exclusive one-to-one
the Japanese automobile industry. In
to multiple competing automobile
and auto manufacturers also buy most
components from multiple suppliers (Itarni, 1988; Richardson, 1993). Therefore, there is a
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complicated network consisting of multiple automobile competitors and component
suppliers with respect to transactions.
From this perspective, some researchers have found that multiple sourcing is
common and could be beneficial to assemblers in the Japanese automobile industry (Itami,
1988; Asanuma, 1989; McMillan, 1990; Martin, et. al., 1995; Nobeoka, 1995). The
literature suggests that leading Japanese auto assemblers might have the ability to maintain
cooperative relationships with each supplier, while at the same time enjoying benefits from
supplier competition. This proposition contrasts with the notion of Japanese auto
assemblers maintaining a cooperative relationship with suppliers through a quasi-
hierarchical industry structure. Our study explores similar issues but from a supplier’s
perspective. The underlining premise is that some suppliers may realize superior
performance by developing a highly cooperative and close relationship with multiple
customers simultaneously.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we discuss a conceptual framework
that hypothesizes specific benefits of customer scope. We also hypothesize that the ability
to realize these benefits will diminish as the needs of incremental customers become more
dissimilar from existing customers. Section 2 explains the research design, sample, and
operational measures. In section 3 we present the results from our analysis of data from
125 component suppliers in Japan. The results indicate a positive relationship between
customer scope and supplier performance although there appear to be diminishing returns to
customer scope as suppliers add “dissimilar” (i.e. non-automotive) customers with
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requirements further from their core knowledge domain. Section 4 discusses the results
from the data analyses and offers implications for management.
1. Theoretical Discussion: The Benefits of Customer Scope
There are a number of benefits that a supplier may realize by adopting a broad
customer scope strategy. These benefits can be divided into three types: (1) learning
opportunities, (2) economies of scale, and (3) bargaining power.
Learning Opportunities
First, firms with more customers will have more diverse opportunities to learn.
Various scholars have recognized that in[erorganizational learning is critical to competitive
success, noting that organizations get ideas and “learn” by observing and importing the
practices of other organizations (March & Simon, 1958:188; Von Hippel, 1988; Levinson
& Asahi, 1996). For example, Von Hippel (1988) found that in some industries he studied,
a firm’s customers were its primary source of innovative ideas. This is particularly relevant
in Japan where Nishiguchi (1994) found that the most important sources of technical
knowledge for Japanese electronics and automotive suppliers were the suppliers’ customers,
not the suppliers’ internal R&D units. Indeed, Japanese automakers purposefully create
interorganizational routines designed to facilitate knowledge transfers between the
automaker and its suppliers. For example, most Japanese automakers have established
supplier associations and internal consulting teams with the explicit objective of facilitating
interorganizational learning. Sake’s ( 1994) and Fruin’s ( 1992) studies suggest that supplier
associations are an important vehicle through which Japanese firms receive technology
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transfers and ideas. Moreover, Lieberman et al (1997) found that suppliers that were
involved in supplier associations, particularly Toyota’s, had higher productivity than
suppliers who were not. Consequently, suppliers that deal with multiple customers may be
able to add value to, or reduce the production costs of, the products they supply to a
particular customer based on information (technologies and processes) acquired from other
customers. Thus, we would expect suppliers that transact with many customers to have
more opportunities for learning, and therefore be more productive and profitable, than
suppliers that deal with few customers.
In addition, an assembler may choose to purchase components that have already been
tested by other assemblers, other conditions being equal. In this case, an assembler maybe
willing to pay a premium to a supplier for quality assurance that the supplier has acquired
through testing the product with other customers. In addition, there are distinct benefits for
customers buying components that have already been tried out by other buyers. As a
Toyota manager noted in an interview, Toyota can simpli~ its internal testing procedures
when a component has already been used by some other assemblers in the market
(Interview, April 1997).
Finally, a supplier with many customers may develop capabilities at managing inter-
organizational transactions better than single-customer suppliers (Martin, et. al., 1995). For
example, a supplier may develop negotiation skills that allow it to extract a greater
percentage of the profits through its experience in negotiating with multiple customers.
Relationship-management capabilities are critically important to suppliers and are difficult
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to develop (Eccles, 1981; Heide and John, 1990). The ability to develop a broad customer
base provides a supplier with more chances to develop these types of relationship-
management capabilities than those that follow a single-customer strategy.
Economies of Scale
Second, a broad customer base may provide suppliers with more opportunities to
capture benefits from scale economies. Figure 1 explains the way customer scope may lead
to economies of scale in a simplified model that compares a broad customer-scope strategy
with a single-customer strategy. In the customer-scope strategy, the supplier sells
Component A to three different customers with minor modifications made to adjust to each
firm’s needs.
——— —— —— ——.
Figure 1
——— —— — —— —.
This model assumes that Firm 1 wants to buy only a limited amount of component A
from this supplier. Therefore, if the supplier follows a single-customer strategy and wants
to achieve the same amount of total sales, it needs to sell three different components to the
single customer. Otherwise, the supplier will be able to sell only one third of the amount, if
it only sells Component A to firm 1. Because the supplier can sell similar components to
multiple customers with the broad customer scope strategy, it can enjoy economies of scale
unavailable to the supplier with a single customer strategy. Of course, the supplier with a
single customer strategy may attempt to increase its sales volume by selling multiple
products to the same customer. This may be a rational strategy, but given the need to
diversi~ into new product domains the single-customer supplier will be at a scale
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disadvantage relative to the supplier selling a similar product (with perhaps some minor
variations) to multiple customers.
The competitive environment in many industries, including automobiles, has
experienced increasingly rapid technological and environmental changes which have shifted
the nature of market demand toward increased product variety (Stalk and Hout, 1990;
Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; Pine, 1993; Sanchez, 1995). In the automotive industry, the
end-customer has demanded increased product variety and automakers have responded by
increasing the number of different models they produce (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991).
Consequently, as product demand has become more diversified, small orders from an
assembler have been increasing. In this environment, there is a greater need than before for
suppliers to achieve scale economies by supplying similar components to multiple
assemblers. This may be one strategy for achieving the benefits of “mass-customization,”
which Pine (1993) and Kotha (1995) have discussed.
Finally, suppliers with a broad customer scope strategy may realize scale advantages
because they have greater opportunities for growth (and hence, size/scale). Single-customer
suppliers are constrained by the growth of that particular customer whereas suppliers with
many customers can tap into the growth opportunities of multiple customers. Thus,
suppliers with many customers have diversified growth opportunities which are likely to
increase the scale and scope of their operations.
Bargaining Power
Finally, a supplier with a broad customer scope tends to have more relative
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bargaining power with each customer because it is less dependent on a single customer for
its profitability (Porter, 1980; Cowley, 1988). A supplier with many customers will find it
less important to give into customer demands (e.g., for price decreases) because the loss of
a single customer has less impact on total sales and profits. It is easier for the supplier to
refise/walk away from less profitable business when other opportunities are available from
other customers.
Because of the factors discussed above, this study hypothesizes a positive
relationship between a supplier’s customer scope and its performance. Specifically, we
hypothesize a positive relationship between a supplier’s customer scope (i.e. number of
customers) and the supplier’s profit performance. Stated another way, we expect a negative
relationship between customer concentration and supplier performance.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the number of automotive customers
an automotive supplier has, and the supplier’s performance.
Diminishing Returns to Customer Scope
Although we expect an automotive supplier to generate value from attracting an
incremental customer due to learning, scale, and bargaining power, the ability to realize
these benefits will diminish as the needs of incremental customers become more dissimilar
from existing customers. This argument is related to the nature of the firm and its efficient
boundaries. Recently, scholars have argued for a “knowledge-based” view of the firm,
suggesting that firms exist in large part due to the firm’s superior ability (relative to
markets) to create, transfer, and recombine knowledge (Conner, 1991; Kogut & Zander,
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1992; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996). However, knowledge is costly to “produce,
maintain, and use” (Demsetz, 1988:177). The costs of internalizing or organizing
exchanges are directly related to the “dissimilarity of transactions” or knowledge (Cease,
1952 [1937]: 342-343; Poppo & Zenger, forthcoming). Presumably, more similar
transactions are those activities that are co-specialized and share common routines,
language, and knowledge domains with other activities. As Conner ( 1991: 141) argues, “the
scale and scope of the firm... depends critically on the degree to which new undertakings
actually are specific to the firm’s existing asset [knowledge] base. It is such ‘relatedness’
that provides opportunity for the gains from generating new, redeployable resources... ”
Thus, we would expect diminishing returns to customer scope as suppliers add
customers with requirements that are different from existing customers (e.g., customers in
different industries). For example, in the automotive industry we would expect the
knowledge that automotive suppliers obtain from non-automotive customers to be less
valuable in servicing existing automotive customers. Furthermore, as the products
produced for additional customers become more dissimilar (due to different customer
needs) the supplier will not be able realize significant benefits from economies of scale.
Thus, we hypothesize that adding “related” customers may have a positive relationship with
performance, while additional “unrelated” customers will have a less significant impact on
performance. In the latter case, the potential advantages of customer scope discussed
earlier such (i.e. learning and scale) are less applicable. In addition, there is some evidence
indicating that diversification into unrelated businesses could have a negative influence on
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profit performance (Rumelt, 1982).
Hypothesis 2: There are diminishing returns to customer scope as suppliers add customers
with needs further from their core knowledge domain (e.g., outside
automotive). Thus, an incremental unit of sales to a non-automotive
customer will provide less of a performance benefit than an incremental unit
ofsales to an automotive customer.
2. Sample and Variables
To analyze the relationship between a supplier’s customer scope strategy and
performance, we used a publicly available database (Japanese Automotive Parts Industry
Association, 1995) which contained data on 348 major automotive component suppliers.
The Japanese Automotive Parts Industry Association (JAPIA) is the primary industry
association of automobile component suppliers in Japan. Therefore, we believe that this
database is highly reliable because the data are provided directly by the suppliers and the
accuracy of the data is monitored by JAPIA.
Among those suppliers covered in the database, complete data as needed in this study
are provided for only 164 suppliers. Since this study focuses on the supplier’s relationship
with vehicle assemblers as direct customers, it further excludes suppliers that do not have
more than 50°/0 of total sales to vehicle assemblers. For example, Matsushita Electronic
Component Co. in the database sells only 14% of its products in the automobile industry.
This would not be a problem if we could obtain performance data for Matsushita’s
automotive component businesses; but we only have performance data for Matsushita as a
corporation which includes a variety of diversified businesses. Regarding the 50°/0 cut-off
point, we have tested the sensitivity of the analysis using several alternative percentages,
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such as 40°/0, 60°/0, 70°/0, and 80°/0. The sensitivity analysis did not change our results or
conclusions. We also chose the cut-off point at 50°/0 because we wanted suppliers where
the automotive industry would be considered as their core business, whereas non-
automotive would be considered as non-core. The final number of suppliers in the sample
was 125, all of which are listed in Appendix 1.
This study used the profit performance of suppliers as the dependent variable
measuring supplier performance. More specifically, we used the annual ordinary pre-tax
profit divided by sales in the fiscal year ending in 1994. Independent variables are also
measured for the same time period.
Customer Scope
This study primarily focuses on automobile assemblers (OEM’s) as the customers.
Customer scope is measured by two alternative variables: the absolute number of OEM
customers and a Herfkdahl index of customer concentration. There are seven groups of
automobile assemblers in Japan: namely, the Toyota group, the Nissan group, Hondzq
Mitsubishi, Mazda, Suzuki, and Isuzu. The Toyota group includes Toyota, Daihatsu, Hino,
Toyota Auto Body, Kanto Auto Works, and Araco, all of which assemble complete vehicles
for Toyota. The Nissan group includes Nissan, Fuji Heavy, Aichi Machine Industry,
Nissan Shatai, and Nissan Diesel Motor. For simplicity, this study considers these firms as
seven independent assemblers, although Toyota and Nissan are actually groups of
assemblers.
The first measure of customer scope is a simple count of customers, the number of
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assemblers out of the seven. Although a simple count of customers provides one measure
of customer scope, it does not fully capture a customer’s dependence on its main customers
which is captured with the Herfindahl index. The Herilndahl Index was calculated by using
the percentages of a supplier’s sales to each assembler among the seven. Total percentages
of these seven assemblers were re-scaled to add up to 100V0 (actual percentages could be
lower than 100% if a supplier sold to other automotive suppliers or non-automotive
customers). The Herfkdahl Index and the number of customers naturally have a strong
correlation (1=-.88; see Table 1). This study hypothesizes that the simple count of
customers will have a positive relationship with supplier performance, while the Herfindahl
index will have a negative relationship with supplier performance.
We also defined two other types of customer scope variables. First, some suppliers
sell components to other automobile suppliers in addition to the seven automobile
assemblers. Second, some suppliers also sell components to non-automobile customers.
We calculated ratios of these two types of sales out of total sales. We define the first as a
“related-customer ratio,” which is a ratio of supplier’s sales to other automobile suppliers
divided by total sales. The second is an “unrelated customer ratio,” which is a ratio of a
supplier’s sales to non-automotive firms divided by total sales. As mentioned earlier,
because suppliers that do not primarily deal directly with auto assemblers are excluded
from the sample, a sum of the related-customer and the unrelated-customer ratios does not
exceed 0.5. We would expect the related customer ratio (percent sales to other automotive
suppliers) to have a significant positive relationship with performance while the unrelated
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customer ratio (percent sales to non-automotive customers) to have a less significant
relationship on performance than the related customer scope measures.
Control Variables
A major challenge in this research was to capture the actual relationship between
customer scope and supplier performance by controlling for other factors. Consequently,
we included several control variables. These variables include a supplier’s scale, the
idiosyncratic influences from specific customers, primary product groups, and the
underlying competitiveness/efficiency of each supplier. The control variables regarding a
supplier’s underlying competitiveness are particularly important because these variables
could be common causes of both customer scope and a supplier’s profit performance. For
example, suppliers with innovative products may attract many customers and achieve
considerable size and scale which in turn is likely to lead to high levels of profitability. In
this case, the relationship between customer scope and a supplier’s performance could be a
spurious one.
First, suppliers were divided into three sub-industry categories depending on the
primary type of products they manufacture: electronics, non-metal or plastic molded parts,
and others (primarily mechanical parts). It may be the case that certain types of products
(e.g., electronics) may be higher value added and inherently more profitable than others.
These variables are included as dummy variables to control for the effects of product type.
Second, a “customer proportion” variable measures the ratio of a supplier’s sales
volume to each customer divided by total sales to the seven assemblers: Toyota, Nissan,
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Mitsubishi, Honda, Mazda, Suzuki, and Isuzu. The idiosyncratic nature of each assembler
(e.g., differences in supplier-management practices) could influence a supplier’s
performance. For example, a large proportion of sales to a price-sensitive customer may
have a negative influence on a supplier’s profit performance (Porter, 1980). Because these
seven assemblers add up to 100°/0, our regression models include dummies for six of the
seven assemblers.
Third, the total sales of each supplier is included to control for scale effects, which
would be expected to have a positive influence on the supplier’s performance. The scale
variable also could be a common cause of both customer scope and supplier performance,
thereby creating a spurious relationship between the two variables tested in this model.
Finally, we try to control for variables with respect to the underlying competitiveness
of a supplier. To control for a supplier’s underlying efficiency (i.e. labor productivity) we
include a proxy of labor efficiency which is the supplier’s sales divided by the number of
employees (sales per employee). We also use each supplier’s sales growth in the past four
years as a proxy of the underlying market competitiveness of the firm’s products. We
would expect both of these variables to have a positive influence on a supplier’s
performance.
3. Results
Table 1 shows descriptive data and correlation matrices for the variables used in this
study. The average profit-sales ratio (ROS) for suppliers in the sample is 2.2’Yo. Sales
proportions for each customer are comparable to the actual total production volume of each
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customer in Japan, which indicates that the sample is representative of the population of
suppliers in Japan. On average, a supplier sells to 2.40 automaker customers and 14°/0 of a
typical supplier’s sales are to other automobile component suppliers while So/Oare to non-
automotive customers. Therefore, on average, the seven assemblers are responsible for
78% of a supplier’s sales.
——— —— —— ——.
Table 1
—— —— —— —— ——
Table 2 shows the results from OLS regression analyses on supplier performance.
Models 1 and 2 do not include the supplier competitiveness variables. Models 1 and 3 use
number of customers as the customer scope variable, while Models 2 and 4 use the
Herfindahl Index. As can be seen in Figure 2, the customer scope variables have, as
predicted, a significant positive relationship with supplier performance in all models, even
after controlling for other factors that may injluence profitability. An increase in one
automaker customer is associated with a .4’% increase in ROS, which represents a roughly
20 percent increase in profitability. The two customer scope measures are highly correlated
and seem to be roughly equivalent predictors of supplier profitability.
—.— —— —— ———
Table 2
_—— —— —— ———
The related-customer ratio also had a positive and significant influence on supplier
performance. This result indicates that in addition to a broad customer scope among auto
assemblers, diversified sales to other automotive suppliers also has a positive influence on
supplier performance. Thus, the data offer strong support for hypothesis one.
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Also in line with our predictions, we found that the unrelated-customer ratio had a
much less significant relationship with performance. Although the relationship between
unrelated customer and performance was positive, it was not significant and had a very low
correlation (.04) with profitability. These findings indicate that non-automotive customers
are less valuable to suppliers than are automotive customers. Thus, these findings support
the idea that dissimilar customers are less valuable than related customers.
Surprisingly, a supplier’s scale, as measured by sales, did not have a significant
influence on performance in the multivariate analysis. This result implies that a high
absolute level of sales does not necessarily lead to high profits and that the positive effects
of customer scope on supplier performance are independent of scale/size. In this analysis,
we need to be carefid about a possible multi-collinearity problem between the two
independent variables: customer scope and total sales. The customer scope variables do
have some correlation with total sales; however, we do not believe that a significant multi-
colliniarity problem exists for the following two reasons. First, tolerances for total sales
and customer scope variables are both above 0.7. Second, the correlation matrix in Table 1
shows that although the sales variable has a weak positive relationship with our customer
scope variables (number of customers and the Herfhdahl Index), there is a strong
relationship only between the customer scope variables and performance, but not between
total sales volume and performance.
Among the customer proportion variables that are used to control for the
idiosyncratic influence of each customer, suppliers that sell more to Honda, and to a lesser
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extent Toyota, tend to make higher profits. Most automobile experts agree that Honda is a
firm that focuses on a product differentiation strategy, as opposed to low-cost strategy, to
the greatest extent among the seven Japanese assemblers (Kajihara and Takagi, 1994). The
nature of Honda’s differentiation strategy may explain this result because a cost-sensitive
customer tends to lower a supplier’s profit (Porter, 1980). Moreover, Honda and Toyota
are both recognized as leading automakers in developing supplier capabilities (Sake, 1994;
Helper & MacDuffie, 1997; Dyer& Nobeoka, 1997).
Finally, as expected there was a significant positive relationship between both market
competitiveness variables and supplier performance. Suppliers with greater efficiency and
sales growth realized higher profits.
4. Discussion
The results support our main hypothesis that customer scope has a positive influence
on supplier performance, even afier controlling for supplier scale/size, type of product,
idiosyncratic influences from specific customers, and the underlying competitiveness/
efficiency of each supplier. Readers who are knowledgeable about Japanese supplier-
automaker relationships may question whether or not we are missing the effect of stock
ownership or afllliated suppliers (kunkei kaisha). One plausible explanation for our
findings is that suppliers with few customers are those who are affiliated (partly owned)
with a particular automaker and that what we are picking up is the fact that aflliated
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suppliers are less profitable than independent suppliers (dokuritsu kaisha).l To test this we
ran a separate analysis to assess whether or not the effect of customer scope seemed to be
independent of stock ownership. We divided both independent and affiliated suppliers into
two groups: those with few customers (less than 3) and those with many customers (3 or
more) to determine whether both affiliated and independent suppliers with many customers
outperformed those with few customers (See Table 3).
——. —— —— .
Table 3
——— — ——— —
—.
——
The results indicate that affiliated suppliers with many customers make significantly higher
profits than those with few customers, and the relationship holds true for independent
suppliers as well.2 Thus, the value of customer scope seems to exist whether or not a
supplier is affiliated or independent.
Although we cannot determine which of the theoretical justifications-learning,
scale economies, or relative bargaining power—best explains the results obtained, our
qualitative interviews with suppliers offer additional insights into the relationship between
1 Previous studies that have examined the profit performance over time of independent companies
versus affiliated companies have found that independents outperform affi Iiates but have higher
profit variance, and thus higher risk (Nakatani, 1984; Lincoln, Gerlach & Ahmadjian, 1995). Our
analysis was done during a recession year in Japan, a year in which affiliates would presumably
perform better due to support from the parent company. We find that supplier profitability is better
explained by the number of customers a supplier has rather than whether it is independent or
affiliated.
2 Consistent with some previous studies (Nakatani 1984; Lincoln et al, 1995), we also found
independent suppliers to be more profitable than affiliated suppliers. Our research suggests that
one reason for that finding is that independent suppliers are more likely to have multiple
customers.
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customer scope, supplier learning, and performance. Our interviews with suppliers3
indicate that the ability of suppliers to learn from multiple customers perhaps best explains
the positive relationship between customer scope and performance. Let us offer two
illustrative cases: Daido Metal (a bearing supplier) and Keyence (a sensor supplier).
Daido Metal is one of three major suppliers of engine bearings in the Japanese
automobile industry. As is true in many product categories, the other two suppliers, Taiho
Kogyo (a Toyota keiretsu firm) and NDC (a Nissan keiretsu firm) sell most of their output
to their keiretsu customer. In fact, historically Toyota has not purchased components from
Nissan keiretsu suppliers and Nissan has not purchased from Toyota keiretsu suppliers.4 As
an independent firm, Daido Metal must protect the confidences of each customer but has
been able to supply to both Toyota and Nissan. Among these three suppliers, Daido Metal
has been the most profitable and most efficient from both a cost and quality standpoint.
According to an engineering manager at Daido Metal, this pefiormance advantage is due to
“competencies developed from data and knowledge accumulated in the long term
interactions with multiple customers, especially Toyota and Nissan” (Author Interview,
April, 1996). In particular, he indicated that Daido Metal was able to improve the quality
and reliability of its products through the engineering tests conducting by multiple
customers using prototypes and computer simulation. Customer firms typically conduct
3 Between 1995 and 1997 we conducted interviews with executives at 11 Japanese suppliers.
4 The reason typically offered for this practice is that the rivalry between Toyota and Nissan has
been so strong that they would not “allow” their keiretsu suppliers to sell to their major rival,
though it would be acceptable to sell to smaller competitors such as Isuzu, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, and
Mazda.
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numerous engineering tests after integrating parts supplied by Daido Metal into a system
product or vehicle product. The customer then gives this feedback to Daido Metal. Data
(e.g., quality, performance, etc.) are also collected and passed onto Daido by OEMS after
products are sold in the market. Consequently, Daido is able to learn from a variety of
customers, a variety of vehicle products, a variety of applications, and so on. Daido
managers indiated that the quantity and quality of these data influence the performance of
new component development. Finally, feedback from engineers at both Toyota and Nissan
has been extremely valuable in helping Daido engineers learn about new technologies and
develop ideas for new product designs.
We found similar results at Keyence, a supplier of sensors for plant automation
and one of the most profitable suppliers in the industry. One of the keys to Keyence’s
success is its ability to learn from, and integrate, the needs of multiple customers in
developing its products. Indeed, Keyence has consciously tried no( to become too closely
aligned with any single customer (keiretsu group) and, according to CEO Takemitsu
Takisaki, has a practice of never developing completely customized products for a
customer, even when large customers like Toyota ask for a specialized sensor. However,
this does not mean that Keyence has not been able to develop highly cooperative
relationships with each of its multiple customers. Instead, the firm works closely with each
of its multiple customers and tries to come up with a family of products that integrate the
needs from a variety of customers. By integrating this knowledge effectively, the firm is
able to create products that have similar value as customized products but can still benefit
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from economies of scale associated with standardized products (Takashima, 1993). This
results in products that have characteristics and value that the customer may not have
thought of, and at a lower price than the customer would have paid for a filly customized
product.
In summary, the multiple customer strategy has provided learning opportunities for
these two suppliers that were not unavailable to competing suppliers who chose, or perhaps
were forced to choose, a single (or narrower) customer scope strategy. These learning
opportunities translated into ideas for new products and product designs, feedback on
product quality and reliability, new process technologies, etc. These case examples suggest
that learning plays an important role in the positive relationship between customer scope
and performance.
However, the fact that “unrelated” customer scope was not significantly correlated
with performance suggests that the type of customer matters. In other words, suppliers may
only gain substantial benefits if they can add customers from whom the supplier can obtain
relevant knowledge that is transferable to other customers.5 Clearly, Daido and Keyence
benefited from their relationships with multiple customers with related needs. Although
related customer diversification may provide learning opportunities that increase
productivity and growth, unrelated customer diversification provides less relevant learning.
5 This is not to suggest that it never makes sense to add customers with needs that are dissimilar
from existing customers. Indeed, dissimilar customers may provide opportunities for learning that
stretch the firm in new directions or provide radically new insights for existing customers.
However, in the short run more similar customers are more likely to provide more relevant
knowledge.
21
Thus, there seems to be diminishing returns to customer scope. Just as some studies (Bakes
& Brynyolfsson, 1993; Uzzi, 1997) have found that buying firms benefit by working with
an optimal number of suppliers (e.g., too few result in incentive problems, too many a lack
of information sharing, investment, and high administrative cm) our findings suggests
that there may be an optimal number of customers. These findings offer empirical support
for the knowledge-based view of the firm which suggests that the efficient boundaries of
firms are driven by knowledge domains/capabilities (Kogut & Zander 1992; Conner &
Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996; Poppo & Zenger, forthcoming).
though
Of course, scale and bargaining power arguments may also be important even
suppliers did not consciously report them as being as important as learning
opportunities. However, if scale alone were of particular importance we would have likely
found a relationship between supplier size and performance. We found no such
relationship. Moreover, although multiple customers may give the supplier some relative
bargaining power, the fact that Japanese auto assemblers have a two-vendor policy (Itami,
1988; Richardson, 1993) and have typically been in the dominant relative bargaining
position (Nishiguchi, 1994) suggests that Japanese automotive suppliers are unlikely to be
able to use relative bargaining power to much advantage. Although we cannot discount
these explanations completely, we believe that “learning opportunities” better explains the
positive relationship between automotive customer scope and performance.
Customer Scope and Cooperative Inter-Firm Relationships
A common perception of the keiretsu system is that relatively exclusive inter-firm
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relationships facilitate close inter-firm ties and that these close ties are beneficial to both
assemblers and suppliers (Nishiguchi, 1994; Helper & Sake, 1994). However, we found
that a less exclusive relationship is generally more beneficial to Japanese suppliers. This
raises an important issue for the performance of the entire network of assemblers and
suppliers: Are relatively exclusive one-to-one relationships necessary to realize the benefits
associated with highly cooperative inter-firm relationships (e.g., information sharing,
relation-specific investments, etc.)? Or is it possible for suppliers to simultaneously
develop close, cooperative partner-like relations with multiple customers?
Our results suggest that it may be possible for suppliers to cultivate relationships
with multiple customers, while at the same time maintaining cooperative relationships with
each customer. This proposition suggests that it is important to distinguish between these
two dimensions--customer scope (or relationship exclusivity) and the degree of inter-firm
cooperation--rather than to simply assume a relationship between the two variables (i.e. the
fewer the customers, the more cooperative the inter-firm relationship). There is
empirical support for the idea that there is an independent relationship between the
some
inter-
firm relationship and the supply structure. Indeed, Walker & Poppo (1991 ), Helper (1989),
and Eccles (1985) found that the degree of cooperation and coordination is not necessarily
high between internal component divisions and sister
indicate that even when an assembler and a supplier
inter-firm relationship could be either cooperative or
assembler divisions. These studies
form an exclusive relationship, the
arms-length depending on how the
relationship is managed. Our interviews with automaker executives also revealed that a
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supplier with a broad customer scope was not necessarily penalized with regard to its ability
to develop a cooperative relationship with that particular customer. For example, Denso, a
major Toyota keiretsu supplier, also sells its components to most of Toyota’s Japanese
competitors, as well as to Ford, Chrysler, and GM. Denso has developed a reputation for
cooperative joint product-development efforts with each customer. Many automakers,
including Chrysler, identified Denso as a “partner” supplier and did not penalize Denso for
being a Toyota keiretsu supplier.
Moreover, a supplier like Denso that has interactions with many customers may
develop capabilities to manage cooperative inter-firm relationships more effectively. For
example, Martin, et. al. (1995) found that suppliers with experience in dealing with more
assemblers have superior abilities to establish additional links with new assemblers or with
the same buyers in new locations such as foreign markets. Their findings imply that firms
may be able to develop inter-organizational management capabilities, which are
accumulated through a variety of inter-firm transactions and can be applied to new inter-
firm linkages. Thus, customer scope may contribute to a supplier’s capabilities in
implementing cooperative joint efforts with each assembler.
Implications for Customer Management
Although this study has emphasized the importance of customer scope for suppliers,
it is’ not sufficient for suppliers to simply increase the number of customers in order to
benefit from customer scope. In order to fully enjoy the economies of customer scope, a
supplier may need to: (1) carefully cultivate relationships with related new customers from
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which they can absorb, and apply, relevant knowledge,
(customer management) capabilities to allow it to develop
with multiple customers simultaneously.
and (2) develop organizational
highly cooperative relationships
Our analysis suggests that suppliers should develop the following capabilities if they
hope to take full advantage of economies of customer scope:
1)
2)
3)
Customer management capabilities; suppliers would do well to carefully
examine, document, and then transfer best practices in managing customer
relationships (e.g., selling and negotiation skills, conflict management, inter-firm
knowledge sharing routines, etc.). The ability to simultaneously manage multiple
cooperative customer relationships is a key capability if suppliers hope to take
full advantage of customer scope.
Absorptive capacity; suppliers must develop the necessary knowledge bases and
processes to effectively assimilate and apply knowledge from each of their many
customers (see Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Suppliers should attempt to cultivate
relationships with customers that can provide relevant knowledge, or knowledge
most closely applicable to the suppliers’ knowledge domain.
Intra-jirm knowledge-transfer capabilities; suppliers must develop internal
processes and routines which allow them to not only learn from each customer,
but also to transfer that knowledge internally so that it can be usefhlly applied to
other customers (Szulanski, 1996). Indeed, effective intra-firm knowledge
transfer processes will have a positive relationship with a firm’s total absorptive
capacity, or the ability to absorb knowledge from external sources.
Thus, the ability of firms to benefit from economies of customer scope will be dependent
on other organizational capabilities with regard to knowledge management.
Finally, this study has an important implication for vertical integration strategies on
the part of buyers. If vertical integration limits the ability of the in-house component
division to access other customers, as some studies indicate that it does (Collis, 1992; Dyer,
1996b), then in-house supply divisions will likely be less productive over the long run.
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Thus, this study highlights a key liability of vertical integration which is reduced access to
customers. This may explain why some firms with high levels of vertical integration (e.g.,
General Motors, IBM, DEC) have over the long run been at a strategic disadvantage
relative to less vertically integrated competitors.
Conclusion
The findings from our study indicate that Japanese suppliers with broad automotive
customer scope tend to be more profitable. This relationship held even after controlling for
supplier scale/size, type of product, idiosyncratic influences from specific customers, and
the underlying competitiveness/efficiency of each supplier. It also held for both
independent suppliers (dokuritsu hmisha) as well as affiliated suppliers (kankei kaisha). We
argue that a broad customer scope strategy leads to superior performance primarily due to
learning opportunities. However, there is a limit to the advantages of a broad customer
base, since sales to “unrelated customers” (e.g., non-automotive) did not have a significant
impact on performance. In short, there appear to be diminishing returns to customer scope
as suppliers add “dissimilar” customers with requirements further from their core
knowledge domaiticapabilities.
Our findings also suggest that studies that focus only on the advantages of long-term
cooperative relationships may be misleading if interpreted to mean that an exclusive
assembler-supplier relationship is the optimal solution for the supplier. Our study suggests
that suppliers should develop customer management capabilities which allow them to
cultivate highly cooperative inter-firm relationships with multiple customers
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simultaneously. This study indicates that the nature of dyadic
assembler network structures are independent issues.
We
explicitly
inter-firm
also understand, however, that further studies are
relationships and supplier-
needed to examine more
the relationships among the assembler-supplier structure, the nature of dyadic
relationships, and the performance of both suppliers and assemblers. Future
research might examine in detail the mechanisms by which suppliers are able to cultivate
highly cooperative relationships with multiple customers. As this study has shown, it is
important to analyze a supplier’s strategy as part of a network of relationships, rather than
as a relationship only at the dyadic level.
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Figure 1
A Model for the Economies of Customer Scope
Customer-Scope Strategy
Ejzq>supp,ier
Single-Customer Strategy
::Bl>suppiier
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Data
1 Profit-Sales Ratio
2 Toyota
3 Nissan
4 Mitsubishi
5 Honda
6 Mazda
7 Suzuki
8 kUZU
9 Number of Customers
10 Herfindahl Index
11 Related Customer Scope
12 Unrelated Customer Scope
13 Sales (Log)
14 Sales/ Employee (Log)
15 Sales Growth
.22>: p<O.01 , .18>: p<O.05
Industrv Dummy Variables:
Ave SD
0.02 0.02
0.30 0.41
0.22 0.35
0.11 0.24
0.17 0.33
0.12 0.28
0.04 0.14
0.05 0.16
2.40 1.70
0.77 0.28
0.14 0.11
0.08 0.10
10.3 0.96
3.56 0.38
0.07 0.29
123456789 10 11 12 13 14
.05 -
.01 -.40 -
-.l I -.19 -,19 -
.23 -.33 -.23 -.17 -
-,21 -.26 -.19 -.10 -.18 -
.06 -.1I -,12 -.02 -.02 -.09 -
-.13 -.16 -.02 -.05 -.14 -.08 -.06 -
.26 -.09 .07 .06 -.OI -.09 .04 .13 -
-.26 .13 -.06 -.16 .05 ,06 -,04 -,14 -.88 -
.20 -.07 .16 ,08 -.09 -.04 .17 -.17 -,04 -,04 -
.04 .04 -.12 ,09 -.04 .06 -.04 .05 .21 -.24 -.28 -
.08 .05 .23 -.23 .07 -.17 -.25 .06 .35 -.19 -.10 -.15 -
.14 .05 -.01 -.02 .09 -.lI -.13 .05 .05 -.06 .10 -.16 ,42 -
.35 .08 -.09 ,14 .00 -.04 -.01 -.ll .06 -.10 .21 -.15 .01 .03
0 1 Mean
Electronics 116 9 0.072
Non-metal 101 24 0.192
Others I 33 I 92 0.736
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Table 2. Regression Analyses for Supplier Performance (N=125)
Independent Variables
Constant
Primary Products (Dummy)
Electronics
Non-metal
Customer Proportion (%)
Toyota
Nissan
Mitsubishi
Honda
Mazda
Suzuki
Isuzu
Customer Scope
Number of Customers
Herflndahl Index
Related Customer Ratio
Unrelated Customer Ratio
Scale
Sales (Log)
Competitiveness
Sales/Employee (Log)
Sales Growth
Adjusted Squared Multiple R
0.014 -0:005 0:010
(0.572)
-0.000
(-0.003)
-0.010 *
(-2.261)
0.0207
(1.789)
0,017
(1.418)
0.003
(0.217)
0.031 **
(2.645)
0.004
(0.290)
0.015
(0.875)
0.004 **
(3.171)
0.048 **
(2.869)
0.015
(0.739)
-0.002
(-1 .022)
0.031
(1.169)
0.002
(0.276)
-0.010 *
(-2.289)
0.021 t
(1,872)
0.018
(1.445)
0.002
(O.169)
0.032 **
(2.727)
0.004
(0.347)
0.018
(1 .040)
-0.023 ***
(-3.280)
0.044 **
(2.612)
0.014
(0.722)
-0.001
(-0.632)
(-o. 199)
-0.002
(-0.305)
-0.011 *
(-2.517)
0.017
(1 .624)
0.019
(1 .647)
-0.005
(-0.368)
0.028 *
(2.60 1)
0.002
(0.2 16)
0.016
(1 .009)
0.004 ***
(3.342)
0.041 **
(2.587)
0.029
(1.543)
-0.005 *
(-1.988)
0.012 *
(2.479)
0.022 ***
(3.838)
(0.388)
0.000
(-0,018)
-0.01 1*
(-2.469)
0.017
(1.632)
0.018
(1.594)
-0.005
(-0.396)
0.029 *
(2.608)
0.003
(0.2 19)
0.018
(1.158)
-0.020 **
(-3.054)
0.037 “
(2.336)
0.029
(1.564)
-0.003
(-1.520)
0.012 *
(2.267)
0.022 ***
(3.705)
0.190 *** 0.195 *** ‘0.314 *** 0;303 ***
*** p<().ool ; ** p<o.ol, * p<o.05, t p<o.lo
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Table 3
Performance (ROS) of Affiliated vs. Independent Suppliers
(Segmented by Number of Customers)
Affiliated* Independent
Few Customers (<3) 1.79% (n=45) 1 .97’XO(n=34)
Many Customers (=>3) 2.68~0 (n=29) 3.22~0 (n=17)
* 5°/0or more of stock owned by automaker
**Performance differences by the number of customers are statistically significant at p<.05
level for both affiliated and independent suppliers.
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Appendix 1: A List of Sample Suppliers
Aisan Industry
Aisin Takaoka
Akashi Kikai Seisakusho
Akebono Brake Industry
Alpha
Ansei Industry
Araco
Art Metal Mfg.
Asahi Iron Works
Asama Giken
Calsonic
Chuo Malleable Iron
Chuo Sprin
Chuyo Spring
Daiichi Forging
Daikin Manufacturing
Delta Kogyo
F-Tech
FCC
Fuji Kiko
Fuji Oozx
Fuji Univance
Futaba Industrial
* Gifu Auto Body Industry
Hashimoto Forming Industry
Hikari Seiko
Hirata Technical
Hiroshima Aluminium Industries
Hirotec
Hoei Industries
Honda Lock MFG.
Horie Metal
Hosei Brake Industry
Howa Textile Industy
Ichikoh Industries
Ikeda Bussan
Imasen Electric Industrial
Izumi Motor
Jidosha Buhin Kogyo
Jidosha Denki Kogyo
Kanbishi
Kansei
Kasai Kogyo
Keihin Seiki MFG.
Keyence
Kikuchi Metal Stamping
Kinugawa Rubber Industrial
Koito Manufacturing
Kojirna Press Industry
Kokusan Kiki
Kotobukiya Fronte
Kuroishi Iron Works
Kushiro Brake Industrial
Kyoho Machine Works
Marujun Seiki Industry
Maruyasu Industries
Meidoh
Meiwa Industry
Microtechno
Mikuni
Minori Industry
Mitsuba Kogyo
Mitsubishi Belting
Mitsuike Industrial
Mitsuiya Industrial
Miura Kogyo
Murakarni
Musashi Seimitsu Industry
Nagoya Screw MFG.
Namicho
Nichirin
Nihon Plast
Niles Parts
Nippon Cable System
Nippon Leakless
Nippon Light Metal MFG.
Nippon Piston Ring
Nippon Power Steering
Nishikawa Rubber
Nishioka Malleable Iron
Nissin Kogyo
Nittan Valve
Ohi Seisakusho
Press Kogyo
Riken
Saga Tekkosho
Sakamoto Industry
Sango
Sankei Giken Kogyo
Sankyo Automotive
Sanoh Industrial
Sanyo Brake Industry
Sensor Technology
Shinko Kogyo
Shiroki
Showa
Somic Ishikawa
Sugihara Hosei Kogyo
Sumino
Tachi-S
Takada Kogyo
Takebu Tekkosho
Takehiro
Tatsumura Textile
TDF
Technol Eight
Tiger Sash Works
Tochigi Fuji Sangyo
Tokyo Buhin Kogyo
Tokyo Radiator MFG.
Tokyo Seat
Topre
Toyo Roki MFG.
Toyo Seat
Toyoda Iron Works
Toyoda Machine Works
Toyota Kakoh
Toyotomi Kiko
Tsuda Industries
Yamada Seisakusho
Yamakawa Industrial
Yamato Kogyo
Yanagawa Seiki
Yorozu
Yutaka Giken
Yutaka Seimitsu Kogyo
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